Civil War Era Studies Faculty Publications

Civil War Era Studies

11-2007

Abraham Lincoln and the Development of the
"War Powers" of the Presidency
Allen C. Guelzo
Gettysburg College

Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cwfac
Part of the Military History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States
History Commons
Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.
Guelzo, Allen C. "Abraham Lincoln and the Development of the "War Powers" of the Presidency." The Federal Lawyer 54 (November
2007), 42-49.

This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of
the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cwfac/53
This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an
authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.

Abraham Lincoln and the Development of the "War Powers" of the
Presidency
Abstract

By conferring on the President the title of "commander in chief," the Constitution created an awkward and
undefined area of presidential prerogative. The first President to have to confront this ambiguity was Abraham
Lincoln, who developed a presidential "war powers" doctrine based on his presidential oath, the Constitution's
"republican guarantee," and the necessity imposed by the novelty of a civil war. This doctrine was seriously
contested in Lincoln's time by both Congress and the judiciary, and it continues to be an unresolved
constitutional question in the present. But Lincoln's use of such war powers is one demonstration of how a
doctrine aimed at awarding the President unilateral powers to override civil liberties safeguards need not
create a lethal threat to democratic and constitutional government.
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and the Development of the
-y conferring on the President the title of "commander

in chief," the Constitution created an awkward
and undefined area of presidential prerogative. The first
President to have to confront this ambiguity was Abraham
Lincoln, who developed a presidential "war powers" doctrine based on his presidential oath, the Constitution's "republican guarantee," and the necessity imposed by the
novelty of a civil war. This doctrine was seriously contested
in Lincoln's time by both Congress and the judiciary, and it
continues to be an unresolved constitutional question in the
present. But Lincoln's use of such war powers is one demonstration of how a doctrine aimed at awarding the President
unilateral powers to override civil liberties safeguards need
not create a lethal threat to democratic and constitutional
government. f) 61,,.
n the day that Charles Sumner heard about the firing
on Fort Sumter, he immediately took himself to the
White House to tell Abraham Lincoln (as Sumner would
tell the President so many more times during the course
of the next two years) that the war had delivered slavery
into the President's hands for destruction. Why the Civil
War-not Congress or the state legislatures-should be
the mechanism for emancipation came down to two
words: "I ... told him," Sumner said, "that under the war
power the right had come to him to emancipate the
slaves." And if Lincoln had pressed Sumner for more details, the President would have learned that Sumner believed that the President's warpower gave him more than
just the opportunity to emancipate slaves. Sumner argued
that the war power of the President... is above the Constitution, because, when set in
motion, it knows no other law. ... The civil power,
in mass and in detail, is superseded, and all rights
are held subordinate to this military magistracy. All
other agencies, small and great, executive, legislative, and even judicial, are absorbed in this transcendent triune power, which, for the time, declares
its absolute will, while it holds alike the scales of
1
justice and the sword of the executioner.
"The existence of this power," Sumner triumphantly
concluded, is something "nobody questions." 2 People
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might have said that it was typical of Charles Sumner to
announce as an accepted fact something that very few
people understood and one that still fewer agreed upon.
The lack of agreement began with the very term, "war
power," which, inconveniently for Sumner's argument,
does not even exist in the Constitution that Sumner believed it superseded. And the debate about the term ran
from that moment through the four most pressing issues
of the Civil War: the suspension of habeas corpus; the
confiscation of rebels' property; the imprisonment and trial of rebel sympathizers and Northern dissidents; and, ultimately, the emancipation of the slaves. And the debate
continued-and continues to this day-to run through the
seizures of German property during both world wars, detention of the Nisei in 1942, Truman's nationalization of
the steel industry, the Vietnam War, the failed Iranian
hostage rescue, Lebanon, Grenada, and the gates of
Guantanamo Bay. Despite the passing of 140 years,
Supreme Court opinions, and the War Powers Act of 1973,
we are, in fact, no closer to a comprehensive definition of
the war powers of the presidency than Charles Sumner
was in 1861. And so it might be instructive to take this
opportunity to see in what ways Abraham Lincoln thought
it was possible to take Sumner's advice.
The Constitution splits the responsibility for war: Article
I, § 8, gives Congress the power to announce the legal state
of war (in other words, to "declare War") and to authorize
the raising of an army and a navy, to supervise the state
militias, and to "provide for" calling out those militias "to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions"; but Article II, § 2, lodges the responsibility
for putting those forces into play in an entirely different
branch of the government-the President, who shall be
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States." And once such
wars were over, the power to conclude peace was also
split: the President was given the power to "make Treaties,"
but only with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Dividing the power to wage war between the legislative
branch and the executive branch looked odd against the
background of the English past, where the making of both
war and peace were prerogatives of the Crown. However,
the split made sense to the architects of the Constitution,
who had been bred on John Locke's division of governmental powers into domestic (governed by the legislature)
and the "federative" (the relations between a society and

other nations, which Locke confined to the executive
branch). The framers were also convinced that "the history
of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
human virtue, which would make it wise in a nation to
commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind ...
3
to the sole disposal of a ... president of the United States."
But supposing that the power to make war actually
could, according to this new model, be divided between
Congress and the presidency, what exactly were the powers comprehended under the President's title of "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States"? And no one had
any very clear answer. In discussing the powers of the
presidency in his celebrated Commentaries, Chancellor
James Kent never breathed a word about any "war powers." In fact, Kent limited the operation of wartime powers
of seizure and confiscation to an act of Congress. Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist,No. 69, believed that the
office of commander in chief "would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as the first general and admiral of
the Confederacy," but he saw this is little more than acting
as a sort of general coordinator of military actions-similar
to the power that "the governor of New York" exercised
over the militia-rather than serving as a military officer in
direct command of armies in the field. And the venerable
Justice Joseph Story actually believed that Congress ought
to pass a consent resolution before allowing a president to
take up personal military command. But in 1795, George
Washington took the commander in chief title literally and
rode out at the head of United States forces (with Hamilton at his side) to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. Similarly, when the HMS Leopard shot up the U.S. frigate Chesa-

peake in 1807 for refusing an order to heave to and allow
a search of the American crew for British "deserters,"
Thomas Jefferson immediately took steps to purchase mili4
tary supplies entirely on his own authority as President.
The nearest legal cognate to the war powers of the
President was martial law, but even here, the parallels
were almost useless. In fact, there was only one significant example of the American use of martial law, and it
did not bode well for any attempt to create a broad-based
doctrine of presidential war powers. In December 1814,
Gen. Andrew Jackson proclaimed a state of martial law in
New Orleans, thereby suspending the writ of habeas corpus and imposing a curfew, a civilian draft, and a requirement that any movements in or out of the city be registered with his adjutant-general. Federal District Judge Dominick Hall defied Jackson, and Jackson expelled Hall
from the city. But when news of the Treaty of Ghent arrived in New Orleans on March 13, 1815, Hall promptly
cited Jackson for contempt of court and fined him; Secretary of War Alexander Dallas unsympathetically advised
Jackson to pay the fine. As Jackson learned, the use of
martial law-which chiefly involved suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus and closure of the civil courts, temporary seizures of property, and rule by the militarystuck grotesquely in American throats as a throwback to
British tyranny. 5 Martial law, wrote Supreme Court Justice
Levi Woodbury in 1849, could be used by "a commanding
officer of troops" only to govern his "camp" and "its environs and the near field of his military operations," but not
an inch beyond. "The writ of habeas corpus ... is as much
in force in intestine war as in peace," Woodbury declared,
"and the empire of the laws is equally to be upheld. 6
But not without opinions, however. In 1842, John
Quincy Adams had warned Southerners that, in the event
November/December 2007 I The Federal Lawyer I43

of a slave insurrection or a war with Great Britain, Congress had the "full and plenary power" to emancipate
slaves if it thought such an emancipation would be useful
in restoring national order or repelling invasion. "It is a
war power," and even though that power had never actually been "called into exercise under the present Constitution of the United States," it was "a settled maxim of the
law of nations" that, in time of war, "the military supersedes the civil power."7 Adams made no attempt to explain whether he thought this "war power" belonged
jointly or separately to Congress or the President; at times,
Adams seemed to be doing nothing more than justifying
the use of martial law as a weapon of emancipation. That
was enough for Charles Sumner, though, who liked to
think of himself as Adams' Elisha: 19 years to the day after Adams' "war powers" speech, Sumner was in Abraham
Lincoln's office, beseeching the President to do what
Adams had done.
,--.mner liked to boast that he was "the first, who in our
-- day, called for this exercise of power." This claim,
strictly speaking, was not true. William Lloyd Garrison issued a pamphlet-sized reprint of John Quincy Adams'
speeches on war powers in order to make his case, and
Adams' son, Charles Francis Adams (whom Lincoln would
pick to represent the United States as American minister to
Great Britain) agreed that "under the war power we can do
what is ...necessary for the purposes of the war, as justified by humanity, good sense, and the consent of Christendom. I know no other limits."8 Necessity, however, could
take a number of astonishing forms: military tribunals acting under different rules of justice than civil courts, arrests
without warrants and imprisonment without trials, surveillance, and (even if indirectly) intimidation of the press.
Nor was it clear what the appropriate reactions from
the courts should be: Should the courts yield the ground
to executive unilateralism on the grounds that the President and the military have to operate by their own rules
and expertise in time of war, or is it the task of the courts
to exercise a skeptical restraint on executive powers?
Judges, after all, are not soldiers and do not have access to
the information soldiers possess about enemy intentions,
nor are the courts in the position to move as swiftly as the
military does in response to enemy threats. On the other
hand, the very atmosphere of wartime emergency has a
nasty habit of causing public panic and a jittery willingness
to acquiesce when the military begins chipping away at
civil liberties; and the nation's executive and military may
display an equally nasty penchant for ratcheting up their
demands for more powers once one level of special powers has been conceded. Moreover, this perspective spoke
to only potential conflicts between the executive branch
and the judiciary. What role, if any, should Congress play?
All these questions, wrapped in a combined atmosphere
of novelty and crisis, were presented to Lincoln, Congress,
and the courts in 1861, and it took the first two years of
the Civil War-and Lincoln's increasingly messy and unpopular use of suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus,
the creation of federal military districts with authority to
44
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detain and try suspected rebels, the enlistment of volunteers and the diversion of funds to equip them without
congressional sanction, the blockade, and, most momentous of all, the emancipation of the. Confederacy's slaves
by presidential proclamation-before a set of specific justifications for the exercise of presidential "war powers" began to crystallize into a reasonable doctrine.
That doctrine came to rest on three legs: (1) the presidential oath of office, (2) the constitutional requirement to
guarantee the states a republican form of government,
and (3) the dictates of necessity. The "oath" justification
was posed most forcibly in 1863 by a New York lawyer,
Grosvenor Lowrey, who would become more famous after the war as Thomas Edison's lawyer and fund-raiser.
According to Lowrey, "It is the duty" (and Lowrey wanted
the emphasis placed squarely on the word "duty") "of the
Commander-in-chief to subdue a great number of persons
actively engaged in supporting the war." His oath to "preserve, protect, and defend" obligated Lincoln to use any
and all means to subdue the rebellion, and neglecting the
use of any means to do so would be grounds for impeachment. 9 Similarly, Joel Prentiss Bishop, a Boston jurist, argued that Lincoln was obligated to flex the powers
of war because of the Constitution's guarantee "to every
State in this Union" of "a Republican Form of Government" (Article IV, § 4). After all, "A republican form of
government implies the voluntary suffrage of the people,"
Bishop reasoned; because such a government did not exist in rebellious South Carolina, "the Constitution ... lays
its power ... upon the President" and authorizes him to
take any measure that will restore a "Republican Government." 10 For the radical Republicans in Congress, those
measures could include the creation of "a military tribunal
... to follow the army, and as we conquer their territory,
sell to the highest bidder the lands of every rebel, to military occupants, who, with arms in their hands, shall take
resident possession by themselves, or their tenants, and
be ready to defend it against all comers." But it was Horace Greeley, who used the pages of the New York Tribune's short-lived monthly magazine, The Continental
Monthly, to bypass any constitutional niceties and justified
the use of war powers by the president purely on the
grounds of necessity. "Who but a fool would question the
right of a man to strike a dagger to the heart of the assassin whose grasp was on his throat, because there is a law
against the private use of deadly weapons?" the Monthly
asked in its October 1862 issue. Just so in war: the right
of survival overrides any constitutional restraint ordinarily
applied to the President. According to The Continental
Monthly, "In such a time, they must all give way to the
11
supreme necessity of saving the national existence."
But were the people who questioned the war powers
doctrine really fools? 12 Lincoln's own party in Congress
was a good deal less than united over the presidential war
powers doctrine, partly because the radical Republicans
wanted the war powers for themselves, and partly because
a number of moderate Republicans were convinced that
equipping the President with nonconstitutional powers for
the purpose of defending the Constitution might create a

cure worse than the disease. Orville Hickman Browning,
one of Lincoln's closest friends and the Illinois resident appointed to fill Stephen A. Douglas' empty seat in the Senate in 1861, balked at "the doctrine ... in favor of absolute
power in the hands of the President, under the name of
Commander-in-Chief," calling it "the most dangerous doctrine ever advocated under a constitutional Government.
... Unless we can save the Constitution with the Union,
we had better let them both go." Benjamin Curtis, who
had co-authored the minority dissent in the Dred Scott decision in 1857, did not doubt that Lincoln was "honestly
desirous to do his duty to the country," but Justice Curtis
drew the line at recognizing Lincoln's possession of some
"implied powers of the President as commander-in-chief in
time of war." The title "commander in chief" only allowed
Lincoln to "do what generals in the field are allowed to do
within the sphere of their actual operations." That did not,
however, include the various powers that Lincoln seemed
to be exercising under the rubric of that title. "I do not yet
see that it depends upon his executive decree whether ...
my neighbors and myself ... should be subjected to the
possibility of military arrest and imprisonment, and trial
before a military commission ... " Even Grosvenor Lowrey
had to admit that, even though the war powers "are the
faithful friends and servants of the Constitution, they are
not constitutional powers; and I am compelled to call
13
them extra-constitutional for want of a better name."
And that was only what Lincoln's friends were saying.
Former Whigs (whose party had come into being to oppose the armed despotism of Andrew Jackson, the "military chieftain"), outright Southern sympathizers, racist
demagogues horrified at the prospect of emancipation,
and Northern Democrats struggling to regain their equilibrium after the electoral defeat of 1860-all joined in a wail
of denunciation, complaining that (1) no presidential war
powers existed or had ever existed; (2) if they did exist,
nothing that Lincoln had done qualified as a war power;
and (3) if they did exist, exercising them required the cooperation of Congress and the judiciary. According to Lincoln's opponents on this issue, by ignoring those objections, Lincoln was a far greater threat to the Constitution
and liberty than the Confederacy was. 14 The nonagenarian Kentucky jurist Samuel Smith Nicholas was shocked
that any president would think of using "that immemorial
tyrants' plea, necessity," which Nicholas believed the
Founders had "intended to extirpate utterly from our system. ... I have not the language to express the surprise,
not to say horror, with which I have witnessed the promulgation of these opinions." Robert Winthrop, the venerable Massachusetts Whig and one-time Speaker of the
House, agreed that invoking such a thing as "war powers"
was "abhorrent to every instinct of my soul, to every dictate of my judgment, to every principle which I cherish as
a statesman or as a Christian." Joel Parker, the Royall Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, upheld Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus in 1861, but he stumbled at
the extension of military powers further than an officer's
"camp ... its environs and the near field of his military
operations." And not only did Parker attack the legitimacy

of issuing a presidential Emancipation Proclamation, but
in 1862 he also launched a failed bid to oust Charles Sumner from his Senate seat. The idea that a president could
emancipate slaves generally across the Confederacy and
declare them "forever free," even after the conclusion of
hostilities, was injecting "the poison of despotic principles
... into the system of the Constitution. ' 15 And Montgomery Throop, a New York lawyer, complained that having any such war power in the President's hands "in connection with the power of arbitrary arrests, will give the
Constitution a speedy and effective coup-de-grace." The
Democratic newspaper The Old Guard simply announced:
"There is no such thing as a war power known to this
country." The "war power," complained Philadelphia Democrat Thomas Jefferson Miles, was merely a tool of the
"so-called Republican, but really Abolition party," to silence free speech as part of a "premeditated conspiracy to
destroy the Constitution," the first step of which had been
6
"the nomination of Abraham Lincoln at Chicago."1
/
ne would have been more surprised at being
fingered as the figurehead of a conspiracy to im,
pose a war powers despotism than Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln had never shared much of Victorian Romanticism's
glorification of men-at-arms; he had burned his fingers as
a member of Congress in 1848 by questioning James K.
Polk's rationale for war with Mexico, and he largely suspected that most of the professional military men of the
republic were Democrats and unsympathetic to his administration. Jefferson Davis, Lincoln complained "had
known all the officers of the regular army. I had never
seen but three of them before I came to Washington as
President. '17 Nor, for that matter, did Lincoln ever try to
construct a comprehensive doctrine of presidential war
powers for use in the ways Thomas Jefferson Miles and
Joel Parker feared. If anything, Lincoln's earlier Whig political inclinations inclined him to defer to Congress in
taking up any national initiatives. "By the Constitution, the
executive may recommend measures which he may think
proper; and he may veto those he thinks Unproper; and it
is supposed he may add to these certain indirect influences to affect the action of congress." But for more than
that, Lincoln maintained that his "political education
strongly inclines me against a very free use of any of
these means, by the Executive, to control the legislation
of the country. As a rule, I think it better that congress
should originate, as well as perfect its measures, without
18
external bias."
What Lincoln did take seriously, however, was his oath
of office, and as Lincoln developed a doctrine of war
powers, this is what became his starting point. "You can
have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors," he warned the secessionists in his first Inaugural
Address, "You have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn
one to 'preserve, protect and defend' it." The oath imposed on him a "duty ... to administer the present government, as it came to his hands, and to transmit it, unimpaired by him, to his successor." Preserving the Union, he
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repeated, is what "the Constitution itself expressly enjoins
upon me," and he wanted to add (but struck out from the
final version) the ominous promise that while secessionists "can forbear the assault upon it, I can not shrink from
the defense of it." 19 This was not a particularly aggressive
way of announcing that disunion would be resisted by
whatever means Lincoln decided to use; as in so many of
his key writings, the voice is a passive one, as though he
were being forced into a task he would normally find unpleasant were it not for the dictates of the situation. But
anyone who mistook Lincoln's use of the passive voice as
a statement of uncertainty soon learned that his conviction-that the scope of presidential response is narrowed
by the actions of others-made him take the most vigorous forms of action. And anyone who imagined that Lincoln took the oath of office as a mere rhetorical formality
would soon discover how painfully dear the idea of hon20
or-of fidelity to promises above all else-was to him.
Lincoln did not expect, however, that the oath would
plunge him into civil war. "It shall be my endeavor to preserve the peace of this country so far as it can possibly be
done, consistently with the maintenance of the institutions
of the country," he promised a pre-inaugural crowd in Harrisburg, Pa. "With my consent, or without my great displeasure, this country shall never witness the shedding of
one drop of blood in fraternal strife."21 He negotiated
strenuously to avoid a clash over Fort Sumter, even to the
point of promising Alexander Boteler that he would discourage the final session of the 36th Congress from passing
a bill authorizing the militia to be called up. 22 And, unlike
Andrew Jackson in 1832, he sent, not an army, but an unarmed transport to relieve the Sumter garrison--only to
have the Confederates bombard Fort Sumter into submission before the supplies could reach the fort. Lincoln was
surprised yet again when, under the terms of the Militia Act
of 1795, he called up 75,000 state militia for the statutory
three months of service--only to have the governors of
Delaware and Maryland reply that their militia would be
available for defending only the capital, and the governors
of Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas state
frankly that their militias would "not be furnished to the
powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they
have in view." 23 But worst of all, Lincoln had to endure an
agonizing four weeks after the firing on Sumter waiting for
the militia of the Northern states to force their way through
to the capital, while government employees were mustered
to defend the White House, General Winfield Scott sandbagged the Treasury building as a last-stand bunker, and
Lincoln's two small sons anxiously built a pitiful little fort of
their own on the White House roof. "All the troubles and
anxieties of his life had not equaled those which intervened between this time and the fall of Sumter," he told
Orville Hickman Browning on July 3, 1861.24 And it was
out of that dilemma that Lincoln grasped the second leg of
the war powers doctrine: necessity.
It was primarily necessity that impelled Lincoln to issue,
after the fiasco of the militia call-up, a call for state volunteer units and for an expansion of the regular army (and an
appropriation of funds for equipment). It was also necessi461 The Federal Lawyer I November/December 2007

ty that led him to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in order to assist in the detention of rebel saboteurs along the
Maryland rail and telegraph lines. 25 Congress was not in
session at the time Fort Sumter was fired on, and it was impossible to call a special session before the summer, because too many congressional districts in the vital border
states were still holding congressional elections through the
spring. "No choice was left but to call out the war power of
the Government." He would not state categorically whether
"these measures" were "strictly legal or not," but they did
meet "a public necessity." After all, it seemed to Lincoln absurd that "all the laws" were to be overthrown by the
rebels, while "the government itself" should "go to pieces"
as the President observed the constitutional requirements
of congressional approval. But necessity was not Lincoln's
only argument: harking back to the sanctity of his oath, he
asked, "In such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown" while Lincoln had the power to preserve it by "yielding to partial,
and temporary departures, from necessity?" And, he added
(reaching for the third leg of the war powers doctrine), was
the war power not also mandated by the constitutional
guarantee of "Republican" government? "The Constitution
provides, and all the States have accepted the provision,
that 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government."' Secession,
however, was the very antithesis of a republican govern-ment, and "to prevent" secession "is an indispensable
means, to the end, of maintaining the guaranty mentioned;
and when an end is lawful and obligatory, the indispensable means to it, are also lawful, and obligatory." As he confidentially told Lyman Trumbull, he "did not know of any
law to authorize some of the things he had done; but he
thought there was a necessity for them, & that to save the
constitution & the laws generally, it might be better to do
6
some illegal acts, rather than suffer all to be overthrown."2
Hovering behind these points, however, was a larger,
vaguer notion of constitutional authority--one that could
justify actions that were not just invisible in the Constitution but actually contradicted its express statements. In
spring 1861, the westernmost counties of Virginia repudiated the Virginia secession ordinance, organized themselves
as the "restored" government of Virginia, and in May 1862,
petitioned Congress for recognition as an entirely new
state. The West Virginia statehood bill was bitterly opposed in Congress by antiadministration Democrats for its
"utter and flagrant unconstitutionality"-and for once, they
could quote an explicit ban in the Constitution: in Article
IV, § 3, which states that existing states cannot be subdivided "without the consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned." This proviso caught Lincoln in a dilemma of
his own manufacturing, because all along he had insisted
that secession was a constitutional impossibility and that,
therefore, Virginia had never legally left the Union--or,
presumably, surrendered its right to consent to its own division. When the bill finally ended up on Lincoln's desk in
December 1862, Lincoln was so troubled about signing it
that he convened a special cabinet meeting, requiring all
members to submit written opinions, to discuss the issue.

In the end, however, Lincoln signed the bill, and his justification was almost cloaked in a form of mysticism. The
West Virginia seceders were, strictly speaking, asking for
something that the Constitution forbade by its letter. But
there was more to the Constitution than the letter of the
law. In 1861, Lincoln reflected on the struggles of the Revolutionary War, and it struck him that "there must have
been something more than common that those men struggled for ...something even more than National Indepen-

dence," and that was the "great promise to all the people
of the world to all time to come"-the promise of democracy itself-"that in due time the weights should be lifted
from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an
equal chance." The Constitution, as he wrote during the
secession winter of 1860-1861, was a means to preserving
that principle, not an end in itself-and certainly not a suicide pact that those opposed to the Union could twist to
its own destruction:
The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the
word, "fitly spoken" which has proved an "apple of
gold" to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are the
picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The
picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was
made for the apple not the apple for the picture.
The West Virginians, by seceding from secession, had
put themselves on the side of the angels, and Lincoln was
not about to punish them for violating the letter of the
Constitution when they had risked so much to save its
spirit. "It is said, the devil takes care of his own," Lincoln
wrote. "Much more should a good spirit-the spirit of the
Constitution and the Union-take care of its own. I think
27
it can not do less, and live."
Overriding the letter of the Constitution in favor of its
democratic spirit was not an argument Lincoln liked to resort to, and using it on this occasion drove his critics to ask
whether this was simply a fancy way of saying that Lincoln
"can proceed step by step to grasp the reins of absolute
power." Even the argument based on necessity was "one of
the most startling exercises of the one-man power-which
the history of human government, free or despotic, ever
witnessed. ' 28 And so it went through the course of the war,
as the Lincoln administration proceeded to expand its suspensions of habeas corpus, arrest truculent members of the
Maryland legislature who were agitating for secession, impose an ever-escalating series of conscription measures,
levy direct taxes on incomes, conduct a program of military
arrests that were estimated to have imprisoned 38,000 people (including a former U.S. Congressman, Clement Vallandigham) in 1865, and shut down two Northern newspa-'
pers. "This assumption of power," complained the New
York State Democratic Committee in a public letter in May
1863, "not only abrogates the right of the people ...but it
and the authorstrikes a fatal blow at the supremacy of law
29
ity of the State and Federal Constitution."
But did it? Lincoln "was greatly moved-more angry
than I ever saw him," according to Attorney General Ed-

ward Bates in fall 1863, over state judges who freed civilians detained by military tribunals, and the President
frankly believed that these interpositions had more to do
with Democratic resistance to his politics than it did with
concern over the implications of the war powers on civil
liberties. Lincoln "declared that it was a formed plan of
the democratic copperheads, deliberately acted out to defeat the Govt., and aid the enemy." As Mark Neely
showed in 1991, the estimates of the military arrests made
under the Lincoln administration were wildly exaggerated;
in fact, the total number of arrests probably amounted to
no more than 13,535, by Neely's reckoning-and of those,
vanishingly few occurred north of the Mason-Dixon Line.
By far, the bulk of Lincoln's military detentions were of
what we today might call "enemy combatants"-British
nationals crewing blockade runners, smugglers, draft rioters, guerrillas-as well as of corrupt war contractors, deserters, and bounty jumpers. If anything, Lincoln once remarked, people were more likely to look back on the
Civil War and wonder why he didn't exercise the war
powers with a harder hand: "I think the time not unlikely
to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few
arrests rather than too many," Lincoln replied to New
York's Democrats. In fact, rather than stifling liberty, it
was precisely the doctrine of presidential war powers that
gave Lincoln the opening he needed to proclaim emancipation-"by virtue of the power in me vested, as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army, and Navy of the United
States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a
proper and necessary war measure"-and thus to dodge
the bullet of a federal court challenge if he had issued the
30
Emancipation Proclamation as a civil decree.
the end, Lincoln's implementation of presidential
war powers went in precisely the opposite direction
from the way his critics had feared it would go. More than
necessity, or the oath, or the republican guarantee (which
might contain little or nothing in the way of self-limitations), it was the constant remembrance in Lincoln's mind
that the war powers were a means, not an end, to the promotion of democracy that kept Lincoln from becoming the
outright dictator that his enemies-and some of his
friends-feared. "I do not intend to be a tyrant," Lincoln
said in 1863 to a delegation of radical Republicans who
wanted more vigorous prosecution of dissidents: "I must
make a dividing-line somewhere between those who are
the opponents of the government and those who only oppose peculiar features of my administration while they sustain the government." And when Treasury Secretary Salmon
Chase urged Lincoln to expand the scope of the Emancipation Proclamation to include the slaves of the border states
as well as those of the Confederacy, Lincoln sharply demurred: "The exemptions were made because the military
necessity did not apply to the exempted localities. ... If I
take the step must I not do so, without the argument of
military necessity, and so, without any argument, except
the one that I think the measure politically expedient, and
would I not thus be in the boundless field
morally right ...
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of absolutism? ' 3 1 He frequently reiterated his belief that,

however sweeping his war powers might be, they terminated the moment the war was over, and after that moment,
he was as subservient to the dictates of Congress and the
courts as anyone else; and this even included the power to
grant emancipation. At the Hampton Roads Peace Conference in February 1865, he admitted to Alexander H.
Stephens that, once the war was over, emancipation would
become "a judicial question. How the courts would decide
it, he did not know and could give no answer." If the
courts overturned the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln
would have to either acquiesce or resign from office, and,
although he left no doubt what option he would exercise,
forcible presidential resistance was not one of his choices.3 2 And the federal judiciary, for its part, generally stood
aside and refused to use the war as an opportunity to bind
the war powers doctrine too tightly by judicial dictum.
Consistent with Lincoln's pattern of interposing his war
powers only in specific instances, the judiciary set a similar
pattern of avoiding explicit challenges to the war powers.
Even at moments when the Supreme Court has questioned

Dr Allen C. Guelzo is the Henry R. Luce Professor of the
Civil War Era, and director of Civil
War Era studies at Gettysburg College. He is the author of Abraham
Lincoln: Redeemer President, which
won the Lincoln Prizefor 2000, and
of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America,
which won the Lincoln Prize for
2005. In September 2005, he was
nominated by President Bush to the
National Council on the Humanities.
Photo by Bachrach.
Endnotes
1
David Donald, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE
CIVIL WAR 388 (Knopf 1960); "The Hon. C. Sumner on a

War for Emancipation," THE

ANTI-SLAVERY REPORTER

246

(Nov. 1, 1861).
2Id.
3

John Locke, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 277,
411-412 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 1965); Alexander

certain presidential actions, it has done so on grounds oth-

Hamilton,

er than the president's claim to have the war powers of a

James McClellan eds. 2001).

Thus, even without articulating a detailed description
of presidential war powers, Lincoln succeeded in demonstrating that such war powers could exist outside the normal boundaries of the Constitution without those powers
automatically destabilizing the Constitution itself. As Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes once remarked, "While we
are at war, we are not in revolution." Neither the Constitution nor the idea of democracy was so fragile that they
could not survive the taking-up of arms-and of unusual
powers-in their own defense, and especially when those
powers were consigned to the hands of a leader who had
such painstaking reverence for constitutional and democratic authority. Thaddeus Stevens, who had weighed Lincoln so often in the balance and found him wanting for

LAW 67, 295-303 (G.F. Comstock ed. 1867); Louis Fisher,

33
commander in chief.

not exercising his war powers more relentlessly, paid a
tribute to Lincoln (which was difficult for Stevens) describing him as "the calm statesman ...who will lead you
to an honorable peace and to permanent liberty. ... For

purity of heart and firmness of character he would compare well with the best of the conscript fathers."'34 Lincoln's construction of the presidential war powers was
neither as sweeping nor as dictatorial as the jurists feared
or the opposition complained of, and in an ironic way, it
was precisely Lincoln's refusal to press the war powers to
the extent that they feared that may have cost him his life.
He would not surround himself with military escorts, he
remarked to Charles Graham Halpine, because it would
send too imperial a message about his idea of himself as
President. "It would never do for a president to have
guards with drawn sabres at his door, as if he fancied he
were, or were trying to be, or were assuming to be, an
emperor."3 5 Perhaps, had Lincoln applied those war pow-

ers to his own protection, he might not have come to so
tragic, and so untimely, an end. T'F.

4

THE FEDERALIST,

Chancellor James Kent, 1

COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

286 (Princeton 1985); Alexander Hamilton, THE FED-

69 357;

ERALIST, No.

Joseph

Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE
1486 (1833); Caspar W.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Weinberger, Dangerous Constraintson the President'sWar
Powers, THE FETIERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 97-98 (G.L. Cravitz and Jeremy A.
Rabkin eds. 1989).
5
Robert V. Remini, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1767-1821 207, 313-315 (1977).
6
Levi Woodbury, MartialLaw in Rhode Island, 2 WRITINGS OF LEVI WOODBURY,
ARY 101, 104 (1852).

LL.D.,

POLITICAL, JUDICIAL AND LITER-

7

John Quincy Adams, Abolition of Slavery, CONGRES498-499 (May 25, 1836), 24th Congress, 1st
session; and "Speech of the Hon. J.Q. Adams" (May 25,
1836), 24th Congress, 1st session (Appendix), 448; John
Quincy Adams, Intercourse with Foreign Nations, CONSIONAL GLOBE

GRESSIONAL GLOBE

429 (April 15, 1842), 27th Congress, 2nd

session; Charles Francis Adams, John Quincy Adams and

MartialLaw, 15 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CAL SOCIETY 439-444 (January 1902).
8

MASSACHUSEITS HISTORI-

Charles Sumner to John Murray Forbes (Dec. 30,

1862),

in

2

THE SELECTED LETTERS OF CHARLES SUMNER

136

(Beverly Wilson Palmer ed. 1990); Charles Francis Adams,

2 RICHARD HENRY DANA: A BIOGRAPHY 259-260 (1891);
William Whiting, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 11 (1864, reprint 1971).
9
Grosvenor Porter Lowrey, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: A
DEFENCE UPON LEGAL GROUNDS OF THE PROCLAMATION OF

EMANCIPATION 20 (1863); Leonard Bacon, Reply to Professor
Parker, 22 NEW ENGLANDER AND YALE REV. 196 (April 1863).
10
Joel Prentiss Bishop, THOUGHTS FOR THE TIMES 24

(Boston, 1863).
481 The Federol Lawyer I November/December 2007

No. 74 389 (G.W. Carey and

"1Thaddeus Stevens, Speech on Conquered Provinces,
April 4, 1863, to the Union League of Lancaster, 1 SELECTED
PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS 392 (Beverly Wilson Palmer
ed. 1997); The Constitution as It Is--The Union as It Was,
2 THE CONTINENTAL MONTHLY 379 (October 1862).
12

Isaac Newton Arnold,

THE HISTORY OF ABRAHAM LIN-

702 (Chicago, 1866).
Orville Hickman Browning, Confiscation of Property
CONGRESSIONAL GLOB3E 1136 (March 10, 1862), 37th Congress,
2nd session, and Confiscation of Rebel Property CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE 2972-2973 (June 25, 1862); Benjamin Robbins
Curtis, Executive Power, 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS
COLN AND THE OVERTHROW OF SLAVERY

13

CURTIS,

LL.D.,

WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND MISCELLA-

NEOUS WRITINGS
MANDER-IN-CHIEF

310, 313, 320-321 (1879); Lowrey,
13; W.E. Binkley,

THE COM-

THE POWERS OF THE PRESI-

DENT: PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

14

122-123 (1937).

These objections are similar in substance to the arguments for limiting presidential discretion in treaty-making,
foreign affairs, and international conflicts made by Louis
Henkin, Harold H. Koh, and Michael Glennon; see John
Yoo,

THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND

9/11 5, 144 (Chicago, 2005).
Samuel Smith Nicholas, Martial Law, CONSERVATrvE EsSAYS, LEGAL AND POLITICAL 164, 178-179 (1863); Robert
Winthrop, The PresidentialElection of 1864, ADDRESSES AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER

15

SPEECHES ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS,

FROM

1852

1867 621

TO

(1867); Joel Parker, Habeas Corpus and Martial Law, 92
NORTH AMERICAN REV.

505-506 (1861); Joel Parker,

THE WAR

POWERS OF THE CONGRESS AND OF THE PRESIDENT: AN ADDRESS
DELIVERED BEFORE THE NATIONAL CLUB OF SALEM,

1863 9-10, 31-32, 58 (1863); Joel Parker,

MARCH

13,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL DIVINITY: LETTERS TO REV. HENRY

M. DEXTER AND TO REV. LEONARD BACON 33-34 (1863); Philip
S. Paludan, A COVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CONSTITUTION, LAW
AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 130-133, 143-151 (1975).
16 Montgomery Throop, THE FUTURE: A POLITICAL ESSAY

265-256 (1864); The War Power, 1 THE OLD GUARD 164
(July 1863); Thomas Jefferson Miles, THE CONSPIRACY OF
LEADING MEN OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY TO DESTROY THE

10 (1864).
Abraham Lincoln to John F. Seymour, in RECOLLECTED
WORDS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 400 (Don E. and Virginia
Fehrenbacher eds. 1996); Michael Burlingame, INNER
AMERICAN UNION

17

WORLD OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

90 (1994).

18

Abraham Lincoln, Manuscript Preparedfor the Pittsburgh Speech (Feb. 15, 1861), 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 214 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds. 1953).
19
Abraham Lincoln, First InauguralAddress-Final
Version (March 4, 1861) and First InauguralAddressFirst Edition and Revisions, COLLECTED WORKS, 4:261, 265,
270, 271.
20
Lois J. Einhorn, ABRAHAM LINCOLN THE ORATOR: PENETRATING THE LINCOLN LEGEND

L. Wilson,

38, 63-64, 84 (1992); Douglas

HONOR'S VOICE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ABRAHAM

289-292 (1998).
Abraham Lincoln, Reply to Governor AndrewJ. Curtin
at Harrisburg,Pennsylvania (Feb. 22, 1861), COLLECTED
LINCOLN
21

WORKS, 4:243.
22

226-227 (Alexander K. McClure ed. 1879).
The "War Power" Called Out, THE POLITICAL HISTORY

OF THE WAR
23

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DURING THE GREAT REBEL-

LION 114-115 (Edward McPherson ed. 1864); Lincoln's
April 15th Proclamation (COLLECTED WORKS 4:331-332)
strictly copied the language of the Militia Act (see An Act
to Provide for the Calling Forth of the Militia (Feb. 28,
1795), 1 STATUTES AT LARGE 424 (Boston, 1845).
24
Margaret Leech, REVEILLE IN WASHINGTON, 1860-1865
55-65 (New York, 1941); Julia Taft Bayne, TAD LINCOLN'S
FATHER 69 (Boston, 1931); Orville Hickman Browning, Diary entry, July 3, 1861, in 1 THE DIARY OF ORVILLE HICKMAN
BROWNING 476 (Theodore Calvin Pease ed. 1925).
25
Clinton Rossiter, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 20-25 (R.P. Longacre ed. 1976).
26Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July
4, 1861) COLLECTED WORKS, 4:426, 429, 430, 438, 440; Lyman Trumbull to Julia Trumbull, July 2, 1861, Lyman
Trumbull Papers, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library &
Museum, Springfield, Ill.
27
Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and
the Union (c. January 1861), Address to the New Jersey Senate at Trenton, N.J. (Feb. 21, 1861), Speech in Independence Hall,Philadelphia(Feb. 22, 1861), and "Opinion on
the Admission of West Virginia into the Union" (Dec. 31,
1862), COLLECTED WORKS, 4:168, 236, 240, and 6:27.
28
Throop, THE FUTURE, 268; Winthrop, The Presidential
Election of 1864," ADDRESSES AND SPEECHES, 620-621.
29
CorrespondenceBetween New York Democrats and
PresidentLincoln (May 19, 1863) POLITICAL HISTORY, 163.
30

Burlingame,
Mark Neely, THE

INNER WORLD OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

179;

FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND

133-137, 167-174 (1991); Abraham Lincoln,
To Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), COLLECTED

CIVIL LIBERTIES
WORKS,

31

6:265.

John Hay, Memorandum (Sept. 30, 1863),

AT LIN-

COLN'S SIDE: JOHN HAY'S CIVIL WAR CORRESPONDENCE AND SE-

63 (Michael Burlingame ed. 2000); Abraham Lincoln, To Salmon P.Chase (Sept. 2, 1863), COLLECTED WORKS, 6:428-429.
32
Alexander H. Stephens, 2 A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF
THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 613 (1868-1870); Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 6, 1864)
COLLECIED WORKS, 8:152.
LECTED WRITINGS

33

Rossiter,
2-5.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER-IN-

CHIEF

34

Thaddeus Stevens, Speech on the Copperhead Threat at
the County Union Convention, Sept. 7, 1864, in Lancaster,
and Remarks on the President'sMessage andEmancipation,
Jan. 5, 1865, in Congress, SELECTED PAPERS, 1:502, 513; see
Jonathan Zimmerman, How Lincoln Finessed Security (oped), PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Aug. 1, 2006), in which he
wrote: "You might reply that our liberties define our nation;
if we abandon them, we give up on America itself. But Lincoln said otherwise-and lucky for us."
35
Charles Graham Halpine (pseud "Private Miles O'Reilly"),

BAKED MEATS OF THE FUNERAL:

A

COLLECTION OF ESSAYS,

POEMS, SPEECHES, HISTORIES, AND BANQUETS

at 106-107 (1866).

A.R. Botleler. Mr. Lincoln and the Force Bill. ANNALS
November/December

2007 1 The

Federal Lawyer 149

